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1- INTRODUCTION 
The distribution of sentences on tax-related cases in Spain is significantly different 
from that of other administrative cases. As argued in Pastor (1993), one of its distinctive 
aspects is that the government tends to lose more often in tax-related cases than in any other 
type of cases. Another is that the distribution of sentences varies widely depending on the 
type of taxes. Thus, the purpose of this artiele is twofold: First, we attempt to identify the 
factors that determine the result of tax-related cases; and, second, we use those factors to 
build a model with the purpose of forecasting the government's probability of success in 
this type of cases. 
In a seminal artiele, Priest and Klein (1984) argued that the cases that go to trial are 
those in which there is relatively more uncertainty about their outcome. This divergent­
expectations theory, which follows from the fact that cases that elearly favor either the 
plaintiff or the defendant are settled out of court, implies that a plaintiff (or a defendant) is 
expected to win at trial with a probability of 50%. This theory further argues that deviations 
from the 50% predicted rate can be explained by the stakes of the case (for example, in 
cases ofmedical malpractice, product liability, or workplace injuries), among other factors. 
The divergent-expectations theory has not been devoid of critics; both theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence have been put forward against it. From a theoretical point 
of view, HyIton (1993) argues that a party's proportion of victories could be higher than 
50% if this party has an informational advantage or is favored by the burden of proof, 
among other reasons. From an empirical point of view, on the other hand, Eisenberg (1990) 
reports that the proportion of cases won by plaintiffs ranges between 52% and 84% in 
contract cases and between 25% and 60% in personal-injury cases. l 
Our study uses a sample of over 1,000 tax-related cases decided by the Spanish 
Courts of Appeals during the first quarter of 1992. With these data we attempt to show that, 
due to the characteristics of the area of the law we consider, there is no reason to expect a 
specific rate of success for the government or the plaintiffs like, for example, the 50% rate 
predicted Priest and Klein (1984). Although in principIe any distribution of court outcomes 
I Long before Eisenberg (1990) and Hylton (1993), and even before Priest and Klein (1984), Galanter (1974) 
suggested that a plaintiffs probability of prevailing in court can be explained by the differential stakes of the 
parties, as well as by the nature of the parties (that is, by considering whether the plaintiff and the defendant 
are one-shot players or repeat players). Relevant to this discussion, see also Shavell (1995) 
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is possible in our sample, we will argue that there exist factors (for example, budget 
constraints, risk aversion, and variables affecting threshold probabilities) that have the 
impact of decreasing the dispersion of this distribution. In addition, we generate results that 
may lead to the identification, and hopefully correction, of problems in the system. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first time that our data is analyzed with the approach we 
follow in this artiele. 
The rest of the artiele is organized as follows. In part 11, we consider a plaintiff s 
decision about whether to try a tax-related case under two possible scenarios, namely, one in 
which the type of tax allows the option of settling and one in which it does not. In part 111, 
we derive and estimate a model with two purposes: First, to identify the factors that affect 
the government's probability of success in tax-related cases; and, second, to forecast the 
government's probability of success in this type of cases. Finally, in part IV, we summarize 
the main implications of our analysis. An appendix containing several tables coneludes the 
artiele. 
11- THE PLAINTIFF'S DECISION 
We consider in this part two different frameworks, both stemming from the 
characteristics of our data. Although the data is discussed in more detail below, it suffices to 
note at this point that the cases in our sample can be elassified into those in which 
settlement is possible and those in which it is not. In those cases in which settlement is 
possible, the plaintiff may choose to pay a fine and settle the case in exchange for a 50% 
reduction in the due tax. In those cases in which settlement is not possible, on the other 
hand, a plaintiffs elaim goes directly to court,z We analyze in the next two sections the 
strategic behavior of plaintiffs in cases in which settlement is not possible, and then in cases 
in which it is. 
1.- The Plaintifrs Decision When Settlement Is Not Possible 
In those cases in which settlement is not possible, the critical decision taken by a 
plaintiff is whether or not to sue. As an example, consider the capital gains tax, one of the 
frequent sources of litigation. The process starts when the government sends a taxpayer a 
2 To be sure, this classification of cases into those in which settlement is possible and those in which it is not is 
not always c1ear; but it is in fact the case that settlements are more frequent in sorne type of cases than in 
others. To illustrate, settlements tend to be common in income tax cases taxes and rare in capital gains cases. 
------------------,----------'"---:-------------­
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tax form stating an amount due; the taxpayer can either pay the stated amount or refuse to 
pay and file a claim. In the latter case, since settlement is not possible, then the claim always 
leads to litigation; hence, the plaintiff must decide the amount of resources to be allocated to 
trying the case. Finally, if the plaintiff loses in court, he must decide whether to appeal the 
decision, and, if he does appeal, must decide the amount of resources to be allocated to this 
second stage of the litigation process. 
A simple model. In order to formalize this discussion, let a plaintiff receive a tax 
bill sent by the government for the amount S, which the plaintiff thinks is incorrect. Let Pp 
be the plaintiffs probability of winning a case, and C be his litigation costs under the 
American rule. Thus, a rational (risk-neutral) plaintiff will sue if and only ifpp. S > C; that 
is, if the plaintiffs expected gain from suing (not paying the amount S) is larger than his 
litigation costs. Or, put differently, he will sue as long as long as the probability of winning 
the case is larger than a given threshold; that is, as long as 
(1) 
Thus, if the plaintiffs litigation costs were, say, 10% of the stakes, the plaintiff will sue 
even if the probability of winning is as low as, say, 15%. 
Economies of scale in litigation. It is generally the case that, due to the existence of 
economies of scale in litigation, the ratio of litigation costs to stakes (C/S) decreases as the 
stakes increase. For example, if trying a case in which the stakes are $1 million costs 
$10,000, it is generally not the case that trying a case in which the stakes are $6 million 
costs $60,000; in general, it will cost less than that. As a result, larger stakes imply a 
reduction in the threshold C/S and a subsequent increase in the plaintiff s incentive to sue. 
Note, however, that as long as larger stakes do not imply larger merits (and there is no 
reason why they should), neither they imply a change in the plaintiffs probability of 
success. Therefore, the larger the stakes, the larger the government's probability of success 
at trial. 
To illustrate, suppose a plaintiff is considering two suits: In the first, the stakes are 
$100,000, the plaintiff s litigation costs are $20,000, and his probability of winning is 60%; 
in the second, the stakes are $500,000, the plaintiffs litigation costs are $100,000, and his 
probability ofwinning is 10%. Note that in both cases the plaintiffs litigation costs are 20% 
of the stakes. Note, further, that in the absence of economies of scale (or if the cases are 
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considered in isolation), a rational plaintiff should not try the second case; this is due to the 
fact that, according to (1), a case should be tried whenpp > C/S, which is not the case in the 
example (pp=10% < C/S=20%). However, if economies of scale bring the litigation costs of 
the second casedown to $25,000, then a rational plaintiff will sue (because pp=10% > 
C/S=5%). In short, the existence of economies of scale in litigation implies that a larger 
proportion of "bad" cases (that is, cases in which the plaintiffs probability of success is 
low) will go to court, thus increasing the government's probability of success. 
Litigation costs. As discussed aboye, besides the decision of whether or not to sue, 
a plaintiff that decided to sue must decide the amount of resources to be spent in litigation. 
This decision is important because the probability of winning a case obviously depends on 
the resources allocated to the case by the plaintiff and the government. To fonnalize, let Rp 
and Rg be the amount of resources allocated to the case by the plaintiff and the government, 
respectively; further, let Pg be the probability that the government prevails at trail, and F be 
all the other factors that affect the probability of success of the plaintiff and the government. 
It is then the case that pp=pp(Rp,Rg,F) and pg=pg(Rp,Rg,F), such that 8p;8Rp>0, 8p;8Rg<0, 
8p¡8Rp<O, and 8p¡8R?0. 
If the government ranked cases by their importance (measured by stakes, impact on 
reputation, and the like), and then attempted to maximize the number of wins subject to a 
budget constraint, the government' s optimal choice would maximize social welfare; that is, 
the sentences imposed on the plaintiffs would equal the plaintiffs' expected gains from 
cheating on the government. However, the government's usual decision of allocating an 
approximately equal amount of resources to each case does not maximize social welfare; 
instead, it wastes resources and achieves a lower-than-optimal level of deterrence.3 As a 
result, the government's failure to optimize the amount of resources to be allocated to each 
case tends to decrease the government's probability of success at tria!. 
The role oí intermediate courts. One last issue we address in this section is the role 
perfonned by the Regional Tax Courts and the Central Tax Court. In particular, we argue 
that the larger the proportion of cases that go through these intennediate courts, the larger 
the government' s probability of success should be. This follows from the fact that the 
Central Tax Court and the Regional Tax Courts perfonn the function of deciding the "best" 
3 Further, given this behavior, Rp should be increasing in S; see Pastor (1994). 
~ .---~--------------------r----------------r-------------
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cases (that is, the cases with a large probability of a plaintiffs win) in favor of the plaintiffs; 
as a result, the cases that reach the Courts of Appeal (which are the ones in our sample) have 
a large proportion of "bad" cases. 
To illustrate, assume that there are 50 "good" cases and 50 "bad" cases. Assume, 
further, that a Regional Tax Court decides 25 of the "good" cases in favor of the plaintiffs, 
the other 25 "good" cases in favor of the government, and the 50 "bad" cases also in favor 
of the government. Note that, in the original sample of 100 cases, the government was 
expected to win 50% of the cases; however, out of the 75 cases that reach the Court of 
Appeal (after having gone through the filter of the Regional Tax Court), the government is 
expected to win 50 cases; that is, 75%. Thus, as argued above, the impact ofhaving cases go 
through the Central Tax Court or the Regional Tax Courts is that of increasing the 
government's probability of success at trial. 
There is, however, one opposing effect in those cases that go through the Central 
Administrative Court. Typically, the stakes involved in these cases are large, thus inducing 
plaintiffs to spend relatively more resources in litigation; hence, the government' s 
probability of success at trial should decrease. 
2.- The Plaintifrs Decision When Settlement Is Possible 
In those the cases in which settlement is possible, the plaintiff may agree to pay a 
fine and settle the case, thus being entitled to a 50% reduction in the tax due. To formalize 
this alternative situation, let P be the penalty and R the accrued interest on the unpaid 
amount, and define Q=8+P+R. The payoffs ofa potential plaintiffwhen he chooses to settle 
and to sue are respectively given by Q-( 1/2)8 and (l-pp)Q+C; hence, a rational (risk-neutral) 
plaintiff will sue if and only if (l-pp)Q+C < Q-( 1/2)8. Or, put differently, he will sue as long 
as the probability ofwinning the case is larger than a given threshold; that is, as long as 
p p > (l / 2)(8/ Q) + C / Q. . (2) 
To illustrate, if the amount at stake is $400,000, the penalty is $400,000, the accrued interest 
is $200,000, and the litigation costs are $100,000, a rational plaintiff will sue only if his 
probability ofwinning is larger than 30%. 
Recall that, in the absence of penalties (and interest payments), a rational plaintiff 
sues as long as Pp>C/Q; hence, a plaintiff facing the numbers of our last example would sue 
as long as he perceives the probability of winning larger than 10%. It is thus interesting to 
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note that, if a plaintiff thinks that his chances of winning the case are 20%, he would sue if
 
the issue at stake (that is, the type of tax) does not al10w the option of settling the case, but
 
would not sue if the issue at stake makes a settlement possible. In other words, the existence
 
of the settlement option increases the probability that a plaintiff does no! go to court with a
 
"bad" case, thus decreasing the government's probability of success.
 
In sum, a comparison of the distribution of cases in which settlement is possible and
 
the distribution of cases in which settlement is not possible should exhibit two main
 
differences: First, the former should have fewer cases; and, second, the former should have
 
a smal1er proportion of government's victories.
 
3.- Other Factors Affecting the Plaintiff's Decision 
Besides the factors analyzed aboye (basical1y, stakes, litigation costs, penalties, and
 
probabilities of success), there exist several other factors that determine the decision of
 
plaintiffs, and, therefore, the characteristics of the distribution of sentences. Two of those
 
factors are the merits of a plaintiffs case and the plaintiffs informational advantage; these
 
typical1y refer to the plaintiff s ability to prove his case, as wel1 as to the fact that he knows
 
(and general1y the government ignores) whether or not he is guilty.
 
Risk aversion also plays an important role in a plaintiff s decision of whether or not
 
to sue; see Perloff, Rubinfeld, and Ruud (1993). In particular, the higher the plaintiffs risk
 
aversion, the higher the threshold; that is, the higher the minimum probability of winning
 
that induces a plaintiff to go to court. If it is the case that, as is plausible to assume,
 
plaintiffs are general1y more risk averse than the government, then the impact of risk
 
aversion would be that of decreasing the government's probability of success; this fol1ows
 
from the fact that, the higher the level of risk aversion, the "better" a case must be for a
 
plaintiff to take it to court.
 
Plaintiffs (as well as the government) also take into account issues of reputation
 
when deciding whether to try a case. Plaintiffs, in particular, may be concerned that the very
 
fact of suing may increase the probability of being audited in the future. The government, on
 
the other hand, may decide to try sorne apparently-unimportant cases (in terms, for example,
 
of their stakes) only to send the signal that even minor transgressions of the law will not be
 
tolerated.
 
Final1y, and opposing the effect discussed immediately aboye, budget constraints
 
impose limitations on the number of cases the government can litigate and on the amount of
 
-~-'------'--------------¡----------r-'--'---------~---
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resources it can allocate to each case. Thus, budget constraints may prevent the government
 
from trying a case in which the probability of winning is very low, thus inducing sorne
 
plaintiffs to sue in circumstances in which, budget constraints notwithstanding, they would
 
not.
 
4.- A Syntbesis 
We briefly surnmarize in this section the main issues discussed in this parto We
 
started by classifying cases into those in which settlement is possible and those in which it
 
is not. We then argued that the existence of the settlement option has a negative impact on
 
the government's probability of success.
 
We emphasized that factors that affect thresholds (namely, stakes, litigation costs,
 
and penalties) are important factors determining the plaintiffs decision about whether or not
 
to sue. More precisely, we argued that any factor that lowers the threshold but leaves the
 
plaintiff s probability of winning unchanged increases the plaintiff s incentives to sue, thus
 
increasing the proportion of "bad" cases in the sample, and, as a result, the government's
 
probability of success.
 
Other factors affecting the government's probability of success include the merits of
 
the case, the plaintiffs informational advantage, the plaintiffs' risk aversion, the
 
government's budget constraint, and issues of reputation. In particular, risk averse plaintiffs
 
will tend to try relatively "good" cases, thus decreasing the government's probability of
 
success. 
111- EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We present in this part the results of our empirical analysis. We start by introducing
 
the econometric framework, then we move to discuss the data and the variables to be
 
considered in the model, and then we state our basic hypotheses. Subsequently, we present
 
the results of our initial estimations and of sorne refinements, we perform out-of-sample
 
forecasting in order to evaluate the predictive ability of the model, and, finally, we illustrate
 
a possible use ofthe models with two examples.
 
1.- The Econometric Framework 
Let an index summarizing the government's ability to prove the ith case (Mg¡) and
 
another summarizing the plaintiffs ability to prove the same case (Mp ¡) be expressed as a
 
linear function of k variables; that is,
 
-----------------------,-,-----------,------------­
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M. ="
k+\ 
a.x·· +v. (3)gl L.J J IJ I 
j=1 
k+1 
Mp¡ =¿bjxij + w¡, (4)
 
j=\
 
where (a¡, ... ,ak+¡) and (b¡, ... ,bk+¡) are vectors of coefficients, (X¡, ... ,xk+¡) is a vector of
 
explanatory variables such that x¡=l, v and W are normally-distributed (O-mean) random
 
variables, and n is the number of observations (cases) in the sample. Thus, subtracting (4)
 
from (3) yields the government's relative advantage to prove the ith case (M/), which is
 
given by
 
k~ k~ 
M¡. = Mg¡ - Mp¡ = ¿(aj - b)xij + (v¡ - W¡) = ¿ PjXij + Uij = J¡ + U¡ , (5) 
j=\ )=\ 
k+1 
where Pr(arb), Ui=(Vi-Wi), and Ji=¿ P)Xij' 
j=\ 
Let a court's decision of the ith case (Di) be represented by a dummy variable such
 
that D i=1 represents a situation in which the court decides in favor of the government, and
 
Di=O one in which the court decides in favor of the plaintiff. The government will be
 
successful (Di=l) only ifit presents a better case than the plaintiff; that is, only if Mg¡>Mpi' It
 
thus follows from (5) that the government will win the ith case only when M/>O, which, in
 
turn, implies that J¡+u¡>O. Therefore, the probability that the government wins the ith case,
 
pg=pg(D¡=l)=pg(M/>O), is given by
 
(6) 
where F and f indicate the cumulative distribution function and the probability distribution
 
of u, respectively. In words, equation (6) states that the probability that the government wins
 
the ith case is equal to the probability that that the government presents a better case than
 
the plaintiffs, which, in turn, is given by the cumulative distribution function ofthe random
 
variable u.
 
Finally, since v and ware normally distributed so is u, thus enabling the analytical
 
model to collapse into a probit model; that is, a model in which the government's
 
probability of winning the ith case is given by
 
. ----------,----------,..--------r---¡----------¡-­
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p (D¡ =1) =(21t rl/2 f.II e-tdu¡ = <I>(l¡) , (7) 
g -'" 
where <I> denotes the cumulative standard Normal distribution function. Equation (7) thus
 
surnmarizes the econometric framework and, after introducing the explanatory variables and
 
estimating the model, is the equation that will be used to forecast the government's
 
probability of success in the tax-related cases it litigates.
 
2.- The Data and the Basic Model 
The purpose of our estimations is, as discussed above, twofold: First, we attempt to
 
identify the factors that determine the government' s probability of success; second, we
 
attempt to use those factors to predict such probability in the tax-related cases it litigates.
 
The sample under consideration consists of a set of 1,208 cases decided during the
 
first quarter of 1992 by the Courts of Appeal in the cities of Madrid, Barcelona, Burgos,
 
Valladolid, La Coruña, Valencia, Granada, Málaga, Seville, Las Palmas (Gran Canaria), and
 
Santa Cruz (Tenerife). The dependent variable under consideration (SNTNC) represents a
 
Court of Appeal's sentence on a tax-related case in which the government was a defendant.
 
By definition, this variable takes a value of 1 when the government wins the case, and a
 
value of Owhen the government loses the case.
 
Our basic hypothesis is that the government's probability of success is determined
 
by eight types of variables, namely, the type of tax involved in the case, the stakes of the
 
case, the identity of the plaintiff and that of the defendant, the existence of a previous
 
sentence by intermediate courts, the length of the process, the amount ofresources spent by
 
the plaintiff, and the (appeals) court in which the case is tried. We now move to describe
 
each ofthese variables in more detail.
 
We consider five different types 01 taxes in the model, namely, capital gains taxes
 
(TCG), service fees (TSF), income taxes (TI), capital transactions taxes (TCT), and real
 
estate taxes (TRE). We classify the stakes, on the other hand, in three categories, namely,
 
those smaller than 350,000 pesetas (SS350), those between 350,000 pesetas and 1 million
 
pesetas (S3501M), and those larger than 1 million pesetas (SLIM).4 All variables
 
representing taxes and stakes are dummy variables.
 
4 The base category in the stakes variable is given by those awards not deterrnined by the courts. 
, ----_ .. _---_.,_._------------,,..-------------,--------------­
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Among all possible plaintijJs, we focus our attention on two groups, namely, private
 
finns (PPF) and individuals (PI). In tenns of delendants, on the other hand, we initially
 
bundle in one variable (DLAC) the local governments, the autonomous governments, and
 
the councils. Subsequent to the initial phase of estimation, we disaggregate the variable
 
DLAC into three variables: one for the local governments (DLG), one for the autonomous
 
governments (DAG), and one for the councils (DC). In addition, to assess the impact of
 
intermediate courts, we include one variable representing cases that go through a Regional
 
Tax Court (lCRTC) and another representing cases that go through the Central Tax Court
 
(lCCTC). All the variables representing plaintiffs, defendants, and intennediate courts are
 
dummy variables.
 
In order to account for the length of the process, we incorporate a variable that
 
measures the number of days between the filing of the case and the sentence (LFS), which is
 
the only non-dummy variable of the model. Our proxy for the amount 01resources spent by
 
plaintiffs, on the other hand, is given by the legal team that represents those plaintiffs; we
 
thus include three dummy variables: one for those plaintiffs represented by a legal
 
administrator (RLA), one for those represented by an attorney (RA), and one for those
 
represented by both a legal administrator and an attorney (RLAA). 5
 
Finally, we incorporate into the model ten variables in order to assess the
 
relationship between the result of the cases tried by the government and the court in which
 
those cases are tried. We thus include dummy variables representing courts in the cities of
 
Madrid (CMDRD), Barcelona (CBRCLN), Burgos (CBRGS), Valladolid (CVLLDLD), La
 
Coruña (CLCRN), Valencia (CVLNC), Granada (CGRND), Málaga (CMLG), Seville
 
(CSVLL), Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (CLPGC), and Santa Cruz de Tenerife (CSCT). All
 
these variables are incorporated into the model in a stage subsequent to the initial phase of
 
estimation.
 
Some summary statistics of all the variables defined in this section are reported in
 
Table Al, in part 1 ofthe appendix. We now move to discuss the expected impact ofthese
 
variables on the government's probability of success.
 
s The base category of the representation variable is given by those plaintiffs that represent themselves in
 
court.
 
""---,------------------r--------------------~-----
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3.- Expected Signs of tbe Coefficients 
We present in this section, based on the theoretical arguments presented in the
 
previous part, our expectations about the signs of the coefficients of the variables introduced
 
in the last section. There exist, however, two shortcomings: First, the direct impact of one
 
variable on the government's probability of success may also generate indirect effects of
 
opposite sign; and, second, equally plausible alternative explanations may imply, in several
 
cases, opposing expected signs for a given variable. In both circumstances, we rely on the
 
empirical .analysis to determine which effect predominates.
 
The difference among the types 01 taxes is relevant for at least three reasons. First,
 
because the type of tax determines whether settling the case is a feasible option; as seen
 
above, the existence of the settlement option increases the probability that a plaintiff does
 
not go to court with a "bad" case, thus decreasing the government's probability of success.
 
Second, because the type of tax determines whether the case goes through an intermediate
 
court or goes directly to the Courts of Appeal; as was also seen above, an intermediate court
 
that filters "good" cases has a positive impact on the government's probability of success.
 
Third, because the type of tax is correlated with the identity of the plaintiff and the
 
defendant. As a result of these three effects, the expected sign of most tax variables is
 
ambiguous.
 
To illustrate this ambiguity, consider the capital gains tax. On the one hand, in
 
conflicts that stem from this tax, settlement is not possible; this, as argued above, increases
 
the government's probability of success. On the other hand, conflicts that stem from this tax
 
do not go through the filter of the Central Tax Court or a Regional Tax Court; this, as also
 
argued above, decreases the government's probability of success. Hence, these two
 
opposing arguments force us to reIy on the data to determine the empirical impact of trying
 
a capital gains case on the government's probability of success. The same two conflicting
 
arguments (and implication) hold for the service fees tax and for the real estate tax.
 
Unlike conflicts that stem from the capital gains tax, the service fees tax, or the real
 
estate tax, in conflicts that stem from the income tax, settlement is usually possible; in
 
addition, these conflicts usually go through the filter of the Central Tax Court or a Regional
 
Tax Court. Thus, though the existence of the settlement option decreases the government's
 
probability of success, the filter of an intermediate court increases such probability. Hence,
 
the expected sign for the income tax variable is also ambiguous.
 
. _.-----_._._------------,.-,.-------------,---------------­
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There is, however, no ambiguity about the expected sign of the capital transactions 
tax. Conflicts that stem from this tax do not usual1y al10w the settlement possibility, thus 
increasing the government's probability of success. On the other hand, conflicts that stem 
from this tax usual1y go through the filter of the Central Tax Court or a Regional Tax Court, 
thus increasing again the government's probability of success. Hence, we would expect the 
variable representing transaction taxes to have a positive signo 
The stakes of the case have, in theory, an ambiguous impact on the government's 
probability of success. On the one hand, higher stakes should induce both the plaintiff and 
the government to spend more in the case. However, as discussed above, the government 
does not perform (at least as wel1 as plaintiffs do) an optimization of the resources to be 
al10cated to each case; rather, it tends to distribute resources equal1y among cases. Thus, 
higher stakes would tend to decrease the government's probability of success. On the other 
hand, it fol1ows from equations (1) and (2), and the argument related to the existence of 
economies of scale in litigation, that an increase in the stakes lowers the threshold, thus 
increasing the probability that a plaintiff does not go to court with a "bad" case, thus 
increasing the government's probability of success. Hence, the impact of the stakes on such 
probability is also ambiguous. 
In terms of plaintiffs, we would expect individuals, and, in particular, private firms, 
to have a negative impact in the government' s probability of success. This is due to the fact 
that, in relative terms, these parties tend to allocate more resources than others to litigate 
their cases. In terms of intermediate courts, on the other hand, we already argued that the 
larger the number of cases that go through the filter of either the Central Tax Court or a 
Regional Tax Court, the larger the probability of a government's win should be. Recal1, 
however, that the relatively larger stakes of the cases that go through the Central Tax Court 
induce plaintiffs to spend more, thus decreasing the government's probability of success. In 
other words, the two opposing effects imply ambiguity about the impact of the Central Tax 
Court on such probability. 
Our proxy for the amount 01 resources spent by plaintiffs at litigation is the legal 
team that they have chosen to represent them. In this regard, we would expect al1 three 
variables to have a negative impact on the government's probability of success. Final1y, we 
have no hypotheses conceming the impact of trying a case in any given city; we will thus 
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rely on our data to teH us whether there is any re1ationship between the government's 
probability of success and the cities in which the trials take place. 
4.- Initial Estimation 
We start our empirical analysis by estimating a probit model with seventeen
 
explanatory variables (Model 1); in this first mode1, we neither disaggregate the variable
 
DLAC nor we include the court variables. We thus estimate a model with five variables
 
representing taxes (TCG, TSF, TI, TCT, and TRE), three variables representing stakes
 
(SS350, S3501M, and SLIM), two variables representing plaintiffs (PPF and PI), one
 
variable representing defendants (DLAC), two variables representing intermediate courts
 
(lCRTC and ICCTC), one variable representing the length of the trial (LFS), and three
 
variables representing the amount of resources spent by plaintiffs (RLA, RA, and RLAA).
 
The results obtained for this first estimation are reported in Table A2, in part 2 of the
 
appendix.
 
Table A2 shows that, perhaps as expected in a model with seventeen explanatory
 
variables, and as also expected from our theoretical arguments, not aH the variables are
 
significant. In particular, none of the variables representing stakes, the amount of resources
 
spent by plaintiffs, the type of defendant (DLAC), and the length of the trial are significant.
 
Nor are significant two variables representing taxes (TSF and TCT) and one variable
 
representing intermediate courts (ICRTC). Thus, our first estimation shows that the
 
government' s probability of success is significantly affected by three variables representing
 
taxes (TCG, TI, and TRE), by both variables representing plaintiffs (PPF and PI), and by
 
one variable representing intermediate courts (ICCTC). The fit of the model is not
 
impressive in terms ofthe Cragg-Uhler R2 (.1069),6 although it is not clear that the R2 in
 
probit models can be interpreted as the proportion of variability in the dependent variable 
explained by the independent variables.7 Finally, Model 1 has a reasonably-good in-sample 
prediction success, achieving 61.17% of correct predictions. 
6 The upper bound of the R2 in probit models is not necessarily 1; such upper bound is actually a function of 
the value ofthe log-likelihood function for the constant (LLFC) and the number of observations in the sample 
(n). More precisely, this relationship is given by R2:;;1-exp(LLFC)2/"; see Maddala (1983). Such expression 
2
enables us to determine that, in Model1, the upper bound for the R is in fact 1. 
7 In addition, as shown by Morrison (1972), it is usual to obtain low R2s in models with qualitative dependent
 
variables, although such low values do not necessarily imply that the estimated model is not good. See,
 
however, Goldberger (1973).
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The large number of variables in Model 1 (and the theoretical relationships among
 
them) makes the existence of multicollinearity very likely. As a result, we decided to
 
eliminate nonsignificant variables sequentiaHy, as opposed to eliminate them aH at once. We
 
thus started the process by dropping the least-significant variable, re-estimating the model,
 
eliminating the new least-significant variable, re-estimating again the model, and so forth,
 
finaHy converging to a model with aH significant variables. Such an iterative procedure led
 
us to a model with seven explanatory variables (Model 2), namely, three variables
 
representing taxes (TCa, TI, and TRE), two variables representing plaintiffs (PPF and PI),
 
one variable representing defendants (DLAC), and one variable representing intermediate
 
courts (ICCTC). The results obtained for Model 2 are reported in Table A3, in part 2 of the
 
appendix.
 
Table A3 shows that the seven explanatory variables of Model 2 are significant.
 
More precisely, it shows that (everything else equal) the government is significantly more
 
likely to win cases about capital gains taxes and real estate taxes, and significantly more
 
likely to lose cases about income taxes, cases in which the plaintiffs are private firms or
 
individuals, cases in which the defendant is the local government, the autonomous
 
government, or the councils, and cases that go through the Central Tax Court. The Cragg­

Uhler R2 ofModel2 is slightly lower than that ofModell, but a likelihood-ratio test (LRT)
 
enables us to determine that the ten nonsignificant variables can be dropped from the model
 
without a significant decrease in the likelihood function. 8 FinaHy, the in-sample prediction
 
success of Model 2 is slightly better than that of Model 1, achieving a 61.42% of correct
 
predictions.9
 
5.- Refinements 
We extend in this section Model 2 in two ways: First, we disaggregate the variable
 
DLAC, and, second, we introduce the court variables in order to determine whether there
 
exists any relationship between the government's probability of success and the courts in
 
which the cases are litigated.
 
8 LRT =' 2*(789.08-783.88) = 10.4 < X2 10,.05 =' 18.31. 
9 Note that Model 2 seems to be "pessimistic" in its predictions. This follows from the fact that out of 466 
ineorrect predietions, in 366 (78.54%) the model predicts that the govemment wi1l1ose when the govemment 
actually won the case, 
--------_._-..,---------.,--------~-----¡---------,-----
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We begin by disaggregating the variable DLAC into its three components (DLG, 
DAG, and DC) with the goal of disentangling the impact of each variable on the 
government's probability of success. Such a model with nine explanatory variables (not 
reported) enables us to establish that the significance of the variable DLAC stems almost 
exclusively from the significance of the variable DLG. IO Recall that Model 2 established 
that (everything else equal) the government is more likely to lose when the defendant is the 
local government, the autonomous government, or the councils jointIy considered. The 
results of our first refinement of Model 2 enable us to establish that such a result follows 
almost exclusively from the fact that the government is more likely to lose when the 
defendant is the local government. As a consequence of these results, we re-estimated 
Model 2 by replacing the variable DLAC by the variable DLG, thus obtaining Model 3. The 
results obtained for this model are summarized in Table A4, in part 2 ofthe appendix. 11 
Our second extension (now beginning from Model 3) has the purpose of determining 
whether there exists any relationship between the government's probability of success and 
the courts in which the cases are litigated. In order to perform this test, we sequentially 
introduce into Model 3 the variables CMDRD, CBRCLN, CBRGS, CVLLDLD, CLCRN, 
CVLNC, CGRND, CMLG, CSVLL, CLPGC, and CSCT in order to model the impact of 
the courts in the cities of Madrid, Barcelona, Burgos, Valladolid, La Coruña, Valencia, 
Granada, Málaga, Seville, Las Palmas (Gran Canaria) and Santa Cruz (Tenerife), 
respectively. We follow a sequential process in the sense that we estimated Model 3 eleven 
times, incorporating one court variable in each estimation. In other words, we first estimate 
Model3 by incorporating the variable CMDRD; we then re-estimate Model 3 after dropping 
the variable CMDRD and adding the variable CBRCLN, and so forth, thus incorporating, 
one at a time, all the court variables. 
10 The disaggregation of the variable DLAC caused a problem in the estimation of the model; both the 
estimated coefficient and its standard error of the variable DAG were far larger that those estimated for the 
rest ofthe variables. This was due to the fact that autonomous governments were defendants in only six cases 
(out of 1,208), and in the six cases the government won. Thus, the combination of very few observations and 
identical results caused the estimation problem referred too 
1I A comparison of Models 2 and 3 shows that the latter reaches a higher value in the likelihood function, has 
a slightly higher Cragg-Uhler R2, and achieves the same in-sample prediction success. 
~- ~~_~--_~ __._--.,.----------,-,-----------,---------------­
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We omit results for a11 these estimations but we surnmarize our main findings. 12 The 
estimation of the eleven models enables us to determine that the only courts that have a 
significant impact on the government's probability of success are those in La Coruña, 
Valencia, and Seville. More precisely, the government is (everything else equal) 
significantly more likely to win in Valencia, and significantly more likely to lose in La 
Coruña and Seville. 
Based on the results of the eleven estimations, we re-estimated Model 3 including 
the variables CLCRN, CVLNC, and CSVLL a11 at once, thus obtaining Model 4; relevant 
results for this model are summarized in Table A5, in part 2 of the appendix. Note that this 
table shows that, when the three variables are simultaneously included in the model, the 
variable CSVLL becomes nonsignificant. Note, further, that a comparison of Models 3 and 
4 establishes that the latter reaches a significantly-higher value in the likelihood function,13 
2has a slightly higher Cragg-Uhler R , and achieves a slightly lower in-sample prediction 
success. 
The last refinement we make is that of re-estimating Model 4 after eliminating the 
variable CSVLL, thus obtaining Model 5; relevant results for this model are summarized in 
Table A6, in part 2 of the appendix. A comparison of models 4 and 5 shows that the latter 
reaches a value not significantly lower in the likelihood function,14 has a slightly lower 
Cragg-Uhler R2, and achieves a slightly lower in-sample prediction success. 
6.- Out-of-Sample Forecasting 
As argued aboye, it is not very clear whether, in models with qualitative dependent 
variables, goodness-of-fit statistics can be interpreted as the proportion of the variability in 
the dependent variable explained by the independent variables. Thus, one of the usual ways 
to assess the explanatory power of these models is to evaluate their out-of-sample predictive 
ability. We thus evaluate the out-of-sample forecasting performance oftwo models: one that 
contains a11 the variables that entered the analysis in its different stages, and Model 5. 
12 During the estimation ofthese eleven models, the variable CLPGC caused a problem similar to that caused 
by the variable DAG before. That is, both the estimated coefficient and its standard deviation were far larger 
that those estimated for other variables. This problem stems from the fact that only six cases (out of 1,208) 
were tried in Las Palmas, and the government won al1 six. Thus, the combination of very few observations and 
identical results caused the estimation problem referred too 
13 LRT = 2*(788.44-780.45) = 15.98> x.\.os = 7.81. 
l~ LRT = 2*(781.25-780.45) = 1.66> x.\.os = 3.84. 
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During the estimation of the first of these two models (a model with twenty nine 
explanatory variables) we encountered again the estimation problems referred to above with 
the variables DAG and CLPGC. We thus performed the out-of-sample forecasting from a 
model with aH the explanatory variables except for DAG and CLPGC; relevant results for 
this model (Model 6) are reported in Table A7, in part 2 of the appendix. 15 The out-of­
sample forecasting performance of this model for 100, 200, and 300 observations is 
summarized below in Table 1; the out-of-sample forecasting performance of Model 5, on 
the other hand, is surnmarized in Table 2. 
Table 1: Out-of-Sample Forecasting (Model 6) 
100 Sentences 200 Sentences 300 Sentences 
Actual Actual Actual 
O 1 O 1 O 1 
Predicted O 38 24 Predicted O 68 54 Predicted O 103 77 
1 15 23 1 35 43 1 59 61 
Correct Predictions: 61 Correct Predictions: 111 Correct Predictions: 164 
% Correct Predictions: 61 % Correct Predictions: 55.5 % Correct Predictions: 54.7 
Mean Square Error: .24 Mean Square Error: .25 Mean Square Error: .25 
Table 2: Out-of-Sample Forecasting (Model 5) 
100 Sentences 200 Sentences 300 Sentences 
Actual Actual Actual 
O 1 O 1 O 1 
Predicted O 36 23 Predicted O 77 57 Predicted O 98 65 
1 17 24 1 26 40 1 64 73 
Correct Predictions: 60 Correct Predictions: 117 Correct Predictions: 171 
% Correct Predictions: 60 % Correct Predictions: 58.5 % Correct Predictions: 57 
Mean Square Error: .23 Mean Square Error: .24 Mean Square Error: .23 
Table 1 shows that Model 6 achieves an out-of-sample forecasting success between 
55% and 61%; Table 2, on the other hand, shows that Model 5 achieves an out-of-sample 
prediction success between 57% and 60%. A comparison of both tables shows that the 
predictions from the much simpler Model 5 are slightly better than those from Model 6. 
This can be gathered not only from the percentage of correct predictions of each model, but 
also from the mean square errors of each set of predictions. In short, these results suggest 
15 The variable CMDRD is not in the table because cases tried in Madrid constitute the base category of the 
court variables. Further, the variable DLAC is not in the table because it was disaggregated into its three 
components (DLG, DAG, and De); recall, however, that the variable DAG was finally dropped due to the 
estimation problems mentioned above. 
, 
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that the simpler model is slightly better than the more complicated one as a tool for 
predicting the results ofthe tax-related cases litigated by the government.16 
7.- Computation of Probabilities 
The next step in our empirical investigation is that of estimating the sensitivity ofthe 
government' s probability of success with respect to changes in the explanatory variables 
included in the model. As is well known, in probit models the sensitivity of the dependent 
variable with respect to changes in any given independent variable cannot be interpreted 
directly from the estimated coefficients. This follows from the fact that these coefficients 
•
measure the impact of each independent variable on an index (M¡ in our model) rather than 
on the dependent variable. In other words, the estimated relationship is linear between the 
explanatory variables and the index, but not between the explanatory variables and the 
dependent variable of interest. This last relationship actually depends on the specific point 
in which it is evaluated; we thus follow standard practice and take as a reference point the 
vector of means of the independent variables. 17 
We compute the sensitivity of the government's probability of success With respect 
to changes in the explanatory variables from Models 5 and 6. The resuits estimated for the 
latter model are reported immediately below in Table 3. 
Table 3: Probabilities (ModeI6) 
Variable Probability Variable Probability Variable Probability 
TCG 10.0759 PI -14.3832 CBRCLN 1.5204 
TSF -4.1401 OLG -28.6715 CBRGS 11.0819 
TI -29.2621 OC -38.6917 CVLLOLO 8.6151 
TCT 0.6834 ICRTC -18.3174 CLCRN -8.9291 
TRE 21.8816 ICCTC -51.6603 CVLNC -12.3006 
SS350 0.6794 LFS 0.0006 CGRNO -7.8971 
S3501M -3.9689 RA -14.8136 CMLG -2.3078 
SLlM -4.0410 RLA -10.6300 CSVLL 8.1401 
PPF -17.9500 RLAA -11.9796 CSCT 3.6182 
16 Note from Tables 1 and 2 that the out-of-sample forecasts of Models 5 and 6 are "pessimistic." This fol1ows 
from the fact that, as also noted above, in most of the incorrect predictions the error is that the model predicts 
that the government willlose when in fact the government won. 
17 Technical1y, the probabilistic impact on a dependent variable (y) that follows from a change in any given 
A A 
independent variable (x;) is given by 8y / 8x¡ =~(X~)~ i' where X is the vector of means of the 
A 
independent variables, ~ is the vector of estimated coefficients, and ~ is the standard Normal probability 
distribution. 
. .-----------,------------r---------------,----------¡--­
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Each number in the preceding table shows (everything else equal) the change in the 
government's probability of success when the case concems a given variable. Or, put 
differentIy, it shows the change in the government's probability of success when each variable 
takes a value of 1 (as opposed to O) and aH the other variables are held constant at their mean 
values. For example, everything else equal, the government's probability of success increases 
by 10.08% when the case concems capital gains, decreases 17.95% when the plaintiff is a 
private finn, and decreases 12.30% when the case is tried in the city ofValencia. 
Given that not aH the variables incorporated in Model 6 are significant, we re­
estimated the sensitivity of the government' s probability of success due to changes in the 
explanatory variables from Model 5. Such results are reported below in Table 4. 
Table 4: Probabilities (Model 5) 
Variable Probability Variable Probability Variable Probability 
TeG 9.1465 PPF -18.1149 IeCTC -35.5362 
TI -29.0740 PI -14.2998 CLCRN -13.0191 
TRE 19.6358 DLG -11.4767 CVLNe -13.9391 
Note that the sensitivities estimated with respect to variables included in both Model 5 
and Model 6 are similar, except in the case of the variables DLG and ICCTe. Note, further, 
that sorne of the variables included in Model 6 (but excluded from Model 5) have a larger 
probabilistic impact on the government's probability of success that sorne of the variables that 
survived the sequential estimation.18 With respect to this point, it should be kept in mind that 
the probabilities reported in Tables 3 and 4 are computed by taking into account the estimated 
coefficients but not their standard errors. 
8.- Use of the Estimated Models 
The next two examples briefly illustrate how the models could be used by the 
government to forecast its probability of success (and, perhaps, act accordingly) in two 
hypothetical cases. In both examples, the probabilities are estimated from both Model 5 and 
Model6. 
Example 1: The government must decide whether to try a case concerning the real 
estate tax, with an amount at stake of200,000 pesetas, in which an individual is represented by 
18 The three variables representing the amount of resources spent by plaintiffs in Model 6, for example, affect 
the govemment's probability of success by more than 10% each (in absolute value), whereas the variable 
representing the capital gains tax, which survived the iterative process, affects such probability by only 9%. 
.,-_...._.... __._._----------------,..,.--------------¡---------_. 
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a legal administrator. The case will go through a Regional Tax Court, it is expected to last 900
 
days, and will be tried in the city of Seville. Given this information, the government's
 
probability ofsuccess is 72.41% according to Model 5,19 and 80.38% according to Mode16.20
 
In other words, the government should try this case.
 
Example 2: The government must decide whether to try a case conceming the income
 
tax, with an amount at stake of 2 million pesetas, in which an individual is represented by both
 
a legal administrator and an attomey. The case will go through the Central Tax Court, it is
 
expected to last 100 days, and will be tried in the city of Valencia. Given this information, the
 
government's probability ofsuccess is 3.02% according to Mode15,21 and 2.57% according to
 
Model 6.22 In other words, the government should not try this case.
 
IV- CONCLUSIONS 
Our main purpose has been to identify the factors that determine the government's
 
probability of success in tax-re1ated cases, and to use those factors to forecast such probability.
 
We have also tried to make a contribution to the theory of litigation by putting our results
 
within the context of such theory, and to illustrate sorne interesting characteristics of the
 
Spanish litigation process. As argued aboye, we believe that our data had not been analyzed
 
before with the approach we used in this artiele.
 
We started out by emphasizing an important difference among the cases in our sample,
 
namely, the fact that in sorne types of conflicts settlements are possible case and in sorne other
 
types they are not. We thus outlined two simple mode1s of litigation (one for each type of
 
case), and argued that the existence or absence of the settlement option is an important factor
 
determining the government's frequency of success at trial. In particular we established that,
 
when settlement is possible, "bad" cases (from the plaintiffs point ofview) tend to be settled
 
out of court, thus decreasing the probability that a "bad" case reaches a Court of Appeals. We
 
also discussed other variables that may affect, directIy or indirectIy, the government's
 
19 $(0.46066+0.49441-0.36006) = $(0.5950) = 0.7241.
 
20 $( 1.1644+0.551 05+0.01711-0.36222-0.46129+0.00001 *900-0.2677+0.20499) = $(0.8553) = 0.8038.
 
21 $(0.46066-0.73206-0.36006-0.89477-0.35097) = $(-1.8772) = 0.0302.
 
22 $(1.1644-0.73692-0.10177-0.36222-1.301+0.00001 *100-0.30169-0.30977) = <1l(-1.9478) = 0.0257.
 
...__._----,----------¡-----------,---------;--­
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probability of success, like the existence of intennediate courts, risk averslOn, budget 
constraints, and variables detennining threshold probabilities. 
We argued that, due to the particular characteristics of the area of the law that 
generated the cases in our sample, there is no compelling reason to expect any particular 
frequency of the government's success at trial, like, for example, the 50% rate predicted by 
Priest and KIein (1984). However, we also argued that there exist factors that tend to center the 
range of outcomes, like the government's budget constraint and the plaintiffs thresholds and 
risk aversion. 
Our basic hypothesis in the empirical anaIysis was that the government's probability of 
success was detennined by the type of taxes involved in the litigation, the stakes of the cases, 
the identity of the plaintiffs and the defendants, the existence of intennediate courts, the length 
of the litigation process, the amount of resources spent by plaintiffs, and the court in which the 
cases were tried. Given the theoreticaHy ambiguous impact of many of these variables on the 
government's probability of success, we hope to have produced results that give a step forward 
in the direction of resolving sorne of these ambiguities. 
We have found that the government's probability of success is negatively correlated 
with cases conceming the income tax, cases in which the plaintiff is a private finn or an 
individual, cases in which the defendant is the local government, and cases that have gone 
through the filter of the Central Tax Court. We have found, on the other hand, a positive 
correlation between the government's probability of success and cases conceming capital 
gains taxes and real estate taxes. Finally, we have found that the government is more likely to 
lose in Valencia and La Coruña, and more likely to win in Seville. AH in aH, we believe that 
our results, quite in line with the main propositions of the theory of litigation, may be a usefuI 
empirical starting point to address the open questions left by our current knowledge of the 
litigation process. 
, ! 
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APPENDIX 
1- NOTATION AND DESCRIPTlVE ANALYSIS 
SNTNC: Sentence (=1 ifthe government wins the case; =0 otherwise)
 
TCG: The case is about the capital gains tax.
 
TSF: The case is about the service fees tax.
 
TI: The case is about the income tax.
 
TCT: The case is about the capital transactions tax.
 
TRE: The case is about the real estate tax.
 
SS350: The stakes ofthe case are larger than 350,000 pesetas.
 
S3501M: The stakes ofthe case are between 350,000 and 1 million pesetas.
 
SL1M: The stakes of the case are larger than 1 million pesetas.
 
PPF: The plaintiff is a private firmo
 
PI: The plaintiff is an individual.
 
DLAC: The defendant is a Local government, an Autonomous government, or a Council.
 
DLG: The defendant is a Local government.
 
DAG: The defendant is an Autonomous government.
 
DC: The defendant is a Council.
 
ICRTC: The case goes through a Regional Tax Court.
 
ICCTC: The case goes through the Central Tax Court.
 
LFS: Length (in days) between the filing ofthe case and the sentence.
 
RLA: The plaintiff is represented by a legal administrator.
 
RA: The plaintiff is represented by an attorney.
 
RLAA: The plaintiffis represented by both a legal administrator and an attorney.
 
CMDRD: The case is tried in Madrid.
 
CBRCLN: The case is tried in Barcelona.
 
CBRGS: The case is tried in Burgos.
 
CVLLDLD: The case is tried in Valladolid.
 
CLCRN: The case is tried in La Coruña.
 
CVLNC: The case is tried in Valencia.
 
CGRND: The case is tried in Granada.
 
CMLG: The case is tried in Málaga.
 
CSVLL: The case is tried in Seville.
 
CLPGC: The case is tried in Las Palmas (Gran Canaria).
 
CSCT: The case is tried in Santa Cruz (Tenerife).
 
-.------.------~--------_____r------------------------
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Table Al: Oescriptive Statistics 
Variable Cases Won Lost Mean SO 
SNTNC 1,208 561 647 
TCG 363 199 164 0.30050 0.45866 
TSF 108 42 66 0.08940 0.28544 
TI 120 28 92 0.09934 0.29924 
TCT 75 43 32 0.06209 0.24141 
TRE 47 30 17 0.03891 0.19345 
SS350 435 218 217 0.36010 0.48023 
S3501M 246 104 142 0.20364 0.40287 
SLIM 277 121 156 0.22930 0.42056 
PPF 509 220 289 0.42136 0.49398 
PI 438 179 259 0.36258 0.48094 
OLG 595 263 332 0.49255 0.50015 
OAG 6 6 O 0.00497 0.07033 
OC 12 4 8 0.00993 0.09921 
ICRTC 534 268 266 0.44205 0.49684 
ICCTC 36 8 28 0.02980 0.17011 
LFS 1,208 1059.80000 614.36000 
RA 286 120 166 0.23675 0.42527 
RLA 339 160 179 0.28063 0.44949 
RLAA 563 269 294 0.46606 0.49905 
CMORD 427 217 210 0.35348 0.47825 
CBRCLN 186 78 108 0.15397 0.36107 
CBRGS 39 21 18 0.03229 0.17683 
CVLLOLO 39 18 21 0.03229 0.17683 
CLCRN 101 37 64 0.08361 0.27692 
CVLNC 179 65 114 0.14818 0.35542 
CGRNO 33 14 19 0.02732 0.16308 
CMLG 24 10 14 0.01987 0.13960 
CSVLL 156 86 70 0.12914 0.33549 
CLPGC 6 6 O 0.00497 0.07033 
CSCT 18 9 9 0.01490 0.12121 
Means and standard deviations (SO) computed on the basis of 1,208 observations. "Won" and "Lost" 
both considered from the government's point ofview. 
-----------,--------..,--------------,-------------­
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2- ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
 
Table A2: Model 1 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-ratio EAM 
TCG 0.23921 0.09754 2.4525 0.0618 
TSF -0.10182 0.14025 
-0.7260 -0.0078 
TI -0.65910 0.15573 -4.2323 -0.0563 
TCT 0.13215 0.17269 0.7652 0.0071 
TRE 0.48583 0.20072 2.4204 0.0162 
SS350 0.01173 0.10448 0.1123 0.0036 
S350lM -0.12138 0.11645 -1.0424 -0.0213 
SLlM -0.13117 0.11328 -1.1579 -0.0259 
PPF -0.41549 0.10655 -3.8994 -0.1505 
PI -0.40480 0.10800 -3.7483 -0.1262 
DLAC -0.38668 0.26751 -1.4455 -0.1690 
lCRTC -0.14991 0.26533 -0.5650 -0.0570 
lCCTC -0.93143 0.35781 -2.6031 -0.0239 
LFS 0.00008 0.00006 1.2687 0.0740 
RA -0.40854 0.29914 -1.3657 -0.0832 
RLA -0.34298 0.29822 -1.150 1 -0.0828 
RLAA -0.23643 0.29492 -0.8017 -0.0947 
Constant 0.76005 0.41471 1.8327 0.6535 
LLFM = -783.88 LLFC = -834.26 LRT = 100.74 CRAGG-UHLER RZ = .1069 
IN-SAMPLE ACTUAL 
PREDlCTION O 1 Correct Predictions: 739 
SUCCESS PREDlCTED O 455 277 % Correct Predictions: 61.18 
TABLE: 1 192 284 
EAM=Elasticity at Means; LLFM=log-likelihood function for the model; LLFC=log-likelihood function for the 
constant; LRT=likelihood-ratio test. Observations=1,208. 
Table A3: Model 2 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-ratio EAM 
TCG 0.27761 0.08937 3.1064 0.0717 
TI -0.69446 0.14898 -4.6615 -0.0593 
TRE 0.48284 0.19678 2.4537 0.0161 
PPF -0.41906 0.10189 -4.1130 -0.1517 
PI -0.38806 0.10556 -3.6762 -0.1209 
DLAC -0.29972 0.08412 -3.5630 -0.1308 
ICCTC -0.80528 0.24729 -3.2564 -0.0206 
Constant 0.36608 0.09398 3.8954 0.3144 
LLFM - -789.08 LLFC = -834.26 LRT = 90.36 CRAGG-UHLER RZ - .0963 
IN-SAMPLE ACTUAL 
PREDlCTION O 1 Correct Predictions: 742 
SUCCESS PREDlCTED O 547 366 % Correct Predictions: 61.42 
TABLE: 1 100 195 
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Table A4: Model 3 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-ratio EAM 
TCG 0.28760 0.08986 3.2006 0.0742 
TI -0.69738 0.14867 -4.6907 -0.0595 
TRE 0.48121 0.19651 2.4488 0.0161 
PPF -0.41791 0.10184 -4.1034 -0.1512 
PI -0.38472 0.10559 -3.6435 -0.1198 
DLG -0.3 1466 0.08421 -3.7367 -0.1331 
ICCTC -0.80472 0.24711 -3.2566 -0.0206 
Constant 0.36438 0.09359 3.8935 0.3130 
LLFM = -788.44 LLFC = -834.26 LRT= 9I.64 CRAGG-UHLER R2 = .0976 
IN-SAMPLE ACTUAL 
PREDICTION O 1 Correct Predictions: 742 
SUCCESS PREDICTED O 546 365 % Correct Predictions: 61.42 
TABLE: 1 101 196 
Table A5: Model4 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-ratio EAM 
TCG 0.25331 0.09331 2.7147 0.0654 
TI -0.71358 0.15026 -4.7489 -0.0609 
TRE 0.51403 0.19805 2.5955 0.0172 
PPF -0.44457 0.10331 -4.3034 -0.1609 
PI -0.35033 0.10660 -3.2866 -0.1091 
DLG -0.29672 0.08508 -3.4877 -0.1256 
lCCTC -0.87514 0.24878 -3.5177 -0.0224 
CVLNC -0.32091 0.11119 -2.8861 -0.0408 
CSVLL 0.14915 0.11569 1.2892 0.0165 
CLCRN -0.30045 0.13890 -2.1631 -0.0216 
Constant 0.42019 0.10255 4.0973 0.3610 
LLFM = -780.45 LLFC = -834.26 LRT= 107.62 CRAGG-UHLER R2 = .1138 
IN-SAMPLE ACTUAL 
PREDICTION O 1 Correct Predictions: 740 
SUCCESS PREDICTED O 463 284 % Correct Predictions: 61.26 
TABLE: 1 184 277 
Table A6: Model 5 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-ratio EAM 
TCG 0.23030 0.09164 2.5131 0.0595 
TI -0.73206 0.14943 -4.8991 -0.0625 
TRE 0.49441 0.19737 2.5051 0.0165 
PPF -0.45612 0.10279 -4.4375 -0.1651 
PI -0.36006 0.10624 -3.3892 -0.1122 
DLG -0.28897 0.08484 -3.4063 -0.1223 
lCCTC -0.89477 0.24860 -3.5993 -0.0229 
CVLNC -0.35097 0.10874 -3.2276 -0.0447 
CLCRN -0.32781 0.13731 -2.3874 -0.0235 
Constant 0.46066 0.09752 4.7238 0.3958 
LLFM = -781.28 LLFC = -834.26 LRT= 105.95 CRAGG-UHLER R" = .1122 
IN-SAMPLE ACTUAL 
PREDICTION O 1 Correct Predictions: 712 
SUCCESS PREDICTED O 393 242 % Correct Predictions: 58.94 
TABLE: 1 254 319 
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Table A7: Model6 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-ratio EAM 
TCG 0.25375 0.10186 2.4912 0.0656 
TSF -0.10426 0.14406 -0.7238 -0.0080 
TI -0.73692 0.16127 -4.5696 -0.0630 
TCT 0.01721 0.18022 0.0955 0.0009 
TRE 0.55105 0.20303 2.7141 0.0184 
SS350 0.01711 0.11155 0.1534 0.0053 
S3501M -0.09995 0.12217 -0.8181 -0.0175 
SLlM -0.10177 0.11890 -0.8559 -0.0201 
PPF -0.45204 0.10911 -4.1428 -0.1639 
PI -0.36222 0.10923 -3.3160 -0.1130 
DLG -0.72204 0.24401 -2.9590 -0.3060 
DC -0.97439 0.45515 -2.1408 -0.0083 
ICRTC -0.46129 0.24217 -1.9048 -0.1754 
ICCTC -1.30100 0.35414 -3.6736 -0.0334 
LFS 0.00001 0.00007 0.2072 0.0136 
RA -0.37306 0.30330 -1.2300 -0.0760 
RLA -0.26770 0.30236 -0.8854 -0.0646 
RLAA -0.30169 0.30022 -1.0049 -0.1210 
CBRCLN 0.03829 0.12988 0.2948 0.0051 
CBRGS 0.27908 0.23503 1.1874 0.0078 
CVLLDLD 0.21696 0.22856 0.9492 0.0060 
CLCRN -0.22486 0.16214 -1.3869 -0.0162 
CVLNC -0.30977 0.14220 -2.1785 -0.0395 
CGRND -0.19888 0.24276 -0.8192 -0.0047 
CMLG -0.05812 0.27885 -0.2084 -0.0010 
CSVLL 0.20499 0.14365 1.4270 0.0228 
CSCT 0.09112 0.31030 0.2936 0.0012 
Constant 1.16440 0.42277 2.7541 1.0017 
LLFM = -773.62 LLFC = -834.26 LRT = 121.28 CRAGG-UHLER R2 = .1276 
IN-SAMPLE ACTUAL 
PREDICTION O 1 Correct Predictions: 742 
SUCCESS PREDICTED O 452 271 % Correct Predictions: 61.42 
TABLE: 1 195 290 
......_----_._---,---------,---------------¡---------~---_. 
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